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Til Debt Do Us Part:
The U.S. Capital Market and Foreign Lending: 1920-1955
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes U.S. experience with foreign lending in the half—
century from 1920. A first question raised by this experience is what
ignited the process of U.S. foreign lending. I conclude that lending was
restrained at the beginning of the period by the debt overhang associated
with reparations and by the post World War I disruption of international
trade. Intervention by creditor country governments in the form of the
Dawes Loan, League of Nations loans to Central Europe and reconstruction
of the gold standard system was needed to initiate long—term capital flows.
A second question is how to characterize the operation of the U.S. capital
market once lending was again underway. I find that while lenders
discriminated among potential borrowers and demanded compensation for
default risk, they did so insufficiently. Neither an efficient—markets
nor a fads—and—fashions model provides an adequate characterization of
the data. A third question is whether default in the 1930s made it more
difficult for countries to borrow in the 1940s and 1950s. I find no
evidence that countries which interrupted debt service in the 1930s found
it more difficult to borrow subsequently than did countries which maintained
debt service continuously. Rather, default reduced access to private





Berkeley, CA 947201. Introduction
In happier times (the 1970s), countries were thought to pass through
stages of indebtedness analogous to the stages of the international product
cycle. According to the stages theory (e.g. de Vries, 1971), countries in the
initial phases of the process (before "takeoff into indebtedness") lack the
political stability and economic infrastructure required for borrowing abroad.
Once these preconditions are met, foreign borrowing commences and proceeds
at an accelerating pace. With capital inflows come development, rising
exports and steadily increasing capacity to service foreign obligations. With
rising domestic incomes come increased savings, diminishing the need to borrow
abroad. A point of inflection is reached after which a country's indebtedness
begins to decline. The rise of domestic incomes ultimately permits the debtor
to liquidate its foreign obligations and to transform itself into an
international creditor capable of lending to countries in the early phases of
the cycle. The paradigmatic case is the United States, which seemed to pass
through these stages in the century after 1820.
In these less optimistic times, a typical stages of indebtedness model
would look rather different (e.g. United Nations, 1986). Countries' initial
inability to borrow would be ascribed not to the absence of domestic
preconditions but to caution and pessimism in international capital markets,
often themselves a legacy of previous defaults. Only when some exogenous
event such as an intergovernmental loan or domestic monetary expansion has a
catalytic effect on the market does foreign lending commence. Undue pessimism
gives way to excessive optimism as competing lenders jump on the bandwagon,—2—
pushing loans upon reluctant borrowers and failing to distinguish between good
and bad credit risks. Indiscriminate lending culminates in default,
recrimination and retaliation as lending collapses and -international trade is
disrupted at the expense of economic growth in the capital-importing regions.
Developing countries are unable to borrow for an extended period, returning in
effect to the initial stage of the indebtedness cycle. Here the paradigmatic
case is the half century commencing in 1920, when hesitancy gave way to a
burst of foreign lending after 1923, default after 1930, and a considerable
diminution of private external portfolio lending until the 1970s.
Both characterizations of the process of foreign lending are
oversimplified and overly mechanistic. In some instances, foreign lending has
taken place in response to promising development prospects, foreign funds have
been profitably invested and debts have been repaid, as posited in the
stages-of-indebtedness model. In others, funds have been provided
indiscriminately, invested unproductively, and written off by the lenders.
The question is what mix of the two phenomena characterizes the operation of
the market. Similarly, the impact of default on the growth prospects of the
indebted nations is less clear cut than most would have it. The impact of
default on economic performance in indebted regions hinges in part upon its
implications for access to the international capital market. If nonpayment
damages the debtors reputation sufficiently to impede its ability to borrow
for an extended period, default may have serious economic consequences.
Moreover, if the consequences spill over to other nations by leading to the
collapse of the international capital market, default may have externalities,
the costs of which are incurred by third parties.—3—
In this paper, I view these issues through the lens of the last complete
debt cycle, that spanned by the half-century from 1920.I start in Section 2
by considering the factors that ignited the process of foreign lending,
focusing on the case of the United States. During the early 'twenties, in
sharp contrast to the second half of the decade, relatively little U.S.
foreign lending took place. This raises the question of what first
discouraged the floatation of loans and then initiated the burst of lending.
Was the outlook of capital-market participants transformed by a newfound
ability of sovereign debtors to satisfy the preconditions for foreign
borrowing, as stages-of-indebtedness models would suggest, or by developments
largely exogenous to the debtors? I conclude that lending was restrained
initially by the debt overhang associated with reparations and by the
disruption of international trade -—i.e.as much by conditions -in the world
economy as by conditions in debtor countries.I suggest that the policies of
the creditor governments --specifically,the Dawes Plan, the League of
Nations loans to Central Europe and reconstruction of the gold standard
system -—hada catalytic effect on the market. I consider also the
monitoring and moral suasion exercised by the U.S. Commerce and State
Departments, and ask how they influenced the flow of funds.
In Section 3, I consider the behavior of the market once foreign lending
was underway. At stake is the effectiveness with which the market allocated
funds among competing borrowers. Did market participants discriminate
adequately among good and bad risks? Did they take into account factors
affecting the likelihood of default? To address these questions I analyze the
pricing of foreign bonds, considering the determinants of spreads over the—4—
risk-free interest rate and the implicit default probabilities they imply.
The impression conveyed by this evidence is that lenders discriminated among
borrowers and demanded compensation for the danger of default, but to a
limited extent. Neither an efficient-markets nor a fads-and-fashions model
provides a wholly adequate characterization of the operation of this market.
In Section 4 I consider the consequences of default from the perspective
of relending. Did countries which serviced their loans through the 1930s reap
the benefits of favored access to the capital market? If not in the 1930s
then subsequently, did defaulting nations pay a price in the form of reduced
access to international capital markets?
2. Initiating the Debt Cycle: The U.S. Capital Market in the 1920s
"Current judgments on American experience with the foreign
loans of the 1920's might be refined and corrected if more
attention were paid to the general economic situation at




The United States is the paradigmatic example of a country which appears
to have passed through stages of indebtedness, transfiguring itself from
international debtor to international creditor in the span of 100 years.
Foreign capital played in integral role in the development of American
industry and in the opening of the West. Although the U.S. remained an
attractive destination for foreign capital even as the economy matured, by the
turn of the century American investors had already begun to direct their
attention abroad. In the 15 years prior to World War I, U.S. foreignTable 1
International Investment Position of the United States
1897-1939 (Excluding War Debts)
(in billions of dollars)
End of July 1, End of Year
Item 1897 19141919 1930 1933 1939




Portfolio 0.1 0.9 2.67.26.03.8
Totallong—term 0.7 3.5 6.5 15.2 13.8 10.8
Total short-term -- ——0.52.01.10.6
Total long— and short—term 0.7 3.5 7.0 17.2 14.9 11.4
Foreign Investments in the United
States:
Long-term:
Direct 1.3 0.9l.4 1.82 2.0
Portfolio3 13.1 5.4 1.6431 3.12 43
Total long—term 3.1 6.8 2.5 5.7 4.96.3
Total short-term 0.3 0.5 0.82.70.53.3
Total long- and short—term 3.4 7.2 3.38.45.49.6
Net creditor position of the
United States:
On long-term account -2.4 -3.3 4.09.58.94.5
On short-term account -0.3 -0.5-0.3 -0.7 0.6 -2.7
On long- and short-term account-2.7 -3.8 3.78.89.51.8
U.S. Wholesale Prices (1897 =100) 100 146.7 299.6 185.8 141.7 165.8
1. 1929 data.
2. 1934 data.
3. Includes miscellaneous investments.
4. Net debtor position.
Note: All data for 1919 and data for 1929 on foreign long-term investments in
the United States are unofficial estimates; other data are as estimated
by the Department of Commerce.
Source: Lewis (1938), Lary (1943), U.S. Department of Commerce (1976).—5—
liabilities increased by approximately 4.6 per cent per annum but U.S. foreign
assets increased at more than twice that rate.1 (See Table 1..)
Three-quarters of U.S. foreign lending in this period took the form of direct
investment, primarily in railways, sugar mill machinery and mining and
drilling equipment. Although on the eve of World War I the U.S. remained a
net foreign debtor, the position already was beginning to shift.
Wartime exigencies accelerated America's transition from debtor to
creditor nation. Between 1914 and 1919, largely as a result of loans floated
on behalf of the French and British governments and the liquidation of foreign
holdings of U.S. securities, America's net debtor position of $3.8 billion was
transformed into a net creditor position of comparable magnitude.2 There
followed a surge in peacetime lending matched previously only by the United
Kingdom in the period 1900-1913. U.S. investors lent more than $10 billion to
foreigners in the 11 years ending in 1930, 40 per cent in the form of direct
foreign investment, 45 per cent through the purchase of long—term foreign
securities. Contemporaries were struck by the growth of U.S. portfolio
investment abroad, given the predominance of direct investment in American
lending over previous decades. The earliest estimates, for 189?, show more
than 90 per cent of U.S. foreign investment to have been direct, while
estimates for 1914 suggest that the share of direct investment in the total
was still more than 75 per cent; by 1930 the share of direct investment
had fallen to less than half.
This overview of early 20th century U.S. experience suggests three
questions. First, what explains the magnitude of U.S. foreign lending in the
1920s? Second, what explains the composition --specifically,the rise in—6—
portfolio investment? Third, what explains the timing -—specifically,the
surge in the period 1925-28?
B.Magnitudes
A country's foreign lending is, by definition, the excess of domestic
saving over domestic investment:
(1) NFl =S*GNP—I*GNP
where NFl is net foreign investment (U.S. investment abroad net of foreign
investment in the United States), GNP is gross national product,
S =GrossDomestic Saving/GNP and I =GrossDomestic Investment/GNP.
Differentiating yields:
(2) dNFI =GNP*dS-GNP*dI÷ (S-I)*dGNP
The first term on the right-hand side is the contribution of changes in
saving to U.S. investment abroad, the second the contribution of changes in
investment, the third the contribution of GNP growth. In Table 2 this
decomposition is applied to U.S. data for the early 20th century. In contrast
to thf 1970s, when fluctuations in investment were mainly responsible for
driving the current account (Sachs, 1979), during this earlier period
punctuated by war savings fluctuations generally played the more important
role.
If we compare the prewar decade (1904-13) with that encompassing the war
years (1909-18), the increase in the net private capital outflow is more than
accounted for by the wartime surge in saving. The resulting capital outflowTable 2
Change in U.S. Net Foreign Investment and Its
Proximate Determinants, 1904-1928
























-56 -546 329 168
Note: Components do not sum to totals because of the residual (a small
interaction term).
Source: Calculated from Ransom and Sutch (1983), Appendix Tables A-i, col. 5,
and E-1, cols. 2 and 8.—7—
was moderated, in fact, by the concurrent rise in investment. In contrast,
the growth of GNP accounts for a relatively small share of the growth in U.S.
foreign investment. The net private capital outflow is even larger in the
subsequent period, 1914-23. Since the savings rate was almost identical
immediately before and after the war, it contributes little to changes in U.S.
foreign investment. About a third of the increased capital outflow is due to
the fall in gross private investment after the war, some two thirds to the
growth of nominal incomes.
Moving from 1914—23 to 1919—26, net private foreign investment falls.
This reflects the fact that net private foreign investment was actually
greater during the war than during the boom period of foreign lending in the
second half of the 1920s. Wartime lending took different forms, notably the
repurchase of American obligations held by foreigners. And U.S. foreign
lending in the second half of the 1920s vastly exceeded that in any previous
peacetime period. But it is striking that the volume of net lending in the
second half of the 1920s was by no means historically unprecedented. The
decline in the capital outflow between 1914-23 and 1919-28 is fully accounted
for by the tendency of savings to return to its pre-1909 level.
A full explanation for U.S. foreign lending must also consider the
question from the perspective of the borrowing countries. The excess of U.S.
savings over investment had as its counterpart a shortfall of foreign savings
over foreign investment. In analyzing that shortfall, it is important to
distinguish Europe from other parts of the world, as in Table 3.In the first
half of the 'twenties, Europe's savings-investment balance reflected both a
drastic decline in savings and exceptional returns to investment. Wartime-8-
destruction of plant, equipment and infrastructure had reduced European
industrial production and national income below prewar levels.3 Since this
decline in incomes was recognized as temporary, Europeans wished to reduce
their savings to smooth consumption. Moreover, the quick returns to be reaped
from repairing industrial and commercial capacity provided exceptional
incentive to invest.
In addition to the impact of the war on productive capacity and
utilization and its direct implications for European savings and investment,
there was the recycling associated with reparations. Although great play has
been given to similarities between German reparations in the 1920s and the
OPEC surpluses of the 1970s (e.g. Balogh and Graham, 1979), the parallels
should not be pushed too far. So far as U.S. foreign lending was concerned,
the essence of the reparations question was Germany's need to shift resources
into sectors producing traded goods and her desire to defer large resource
transfers until productive capacity, financial balance and political stability
had been restored. In addition, because the German authorities pursued a
tight monetary policy in the wake of hyperinflation, there was a persistent
high demand for working capital, further increasing the incentive to borrow
abroad. Each of these factors contributed to Germany's demand for foreign
funds. A separate question is whether it was sensible for American lenders to
willingly provide the supply, given the ongoing dispute over reparations.4
In contrast to Europe, the economies of Latin America and the Far East
had been less severely disrupted. Hence incentives for investment in Latin
America were rather different from those in the U.S. and Europe. American
investors were attracted by the prospects for exploiting raw materialTable 3
Distribution of American Foreign Security Issues, 1919-29
(percentages of total, total in millions)
Total in
Constant
Year Europe CanadaLatin America Asia Total (1929)
9 % $m Prices
($m real)
1919 60.3 30.4 8.9 0.2 377.5 259.6
1920 51.5 38.2 10.1 0.0 480.4 334.4
1921 26.2 32.5 38.6 2.5 594.7 580.5
1922 29.5 23.5 31.2 15.6 715.8 704.3
1923 26.1 29.0 27.7 17.0 413.3 391.0
1924 54.7 15.7 19.4 9.9 961.3 934.7
1925 58.9 12.8 14.8 13.2 1067.1 983.0
1926 43.5 20.3 33.1 2.8 1110.2 1056.4
1927 44.2 18.1 26.0 11.5 1304.6 1299.3
1928 48.0 14.8 26.5 10.5 1243.7 1221.3
1929 21.5 44.0 26.5 7.8 658.2 658.2
Note: Components may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Source: Computed from American Underwriting of Foreign Securities (various
issues). The final column deflates the current price total by U.S.
wholesale prices, from U.S. Department of Commerce (1976).—9—
endowments and aiding government programs to promote industrialization.
Outside Europe, Americans were particularly attracted to investments in
infrastructure (public utilities, railways, etc.). Between 1917 and 1924,
U.S. investment in Latin America and the Far East remained small by the
standards of subsequent years, although there were exceptions to the rule:
$230 million and $224 million of Latin American issues were offered in 1921
and 1922 and $100 million of bonds were floated on behalf of the Netherlands
East Indies in 1922. There then followed a dramatic surge in the share of
U.S. foreign investment destined for Latin America. Between 1925 and 1929,
Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia together accounted for a quarter of U.S.
foreign lending.
C.Composition and Timing
Although the dominance of portfolio investment was the most striking
aspect of international capital market experience in the 1920s, direct
investment continued to comprise a significant share of the U.S. total. Over
a third of U.S. direct foreign investment between 1924 and 1929 took the form
of purchases of and investment in public utilities, nearly quadrupling U.S.
holdings in this sector. Primary production (agriculture, mining and
petroleum production) accounted for 28 per cent of the total, manufacturing
for 26 per cent.5 Direct foreign investment was disproportionately destined
for South America, in contrast to portfolio investment, which was most heavily
directed toward Europe.
Relative rates of return played some role in allocating U.S. savings











































































































































































































































































































































yields, which exceeded those on U.S. government securities and high-grade
corporate bonds, if not always those on domestic medium—grade bonds. Despite
sterilization by the Federal Reserve, a steady gold influx in conjunction with
the expansion of bank credit depressed the returns on domestic assets. After
1921. the rate on bankers' acceptances declined to less than 4 per cent, while
call money rates fluctuated between 2 and 5 per cent. Domestic bond yields
declined from 1923 through 1928. In a period such as 1927-28 when
medium-grade domestic bonds yielded only 5 per cent, foreign bonds which
might yield seven or eight per cent were understandably attractive.
Figure 1 shows the relationship of the yields on domestic and foreign
dollar bonds over the 1920s. The yield on domestic medium-grade bonds is
Moody's Baa rate, that on foreign bonds Lary's (1944) sample of 15 foreign
issues. Also plotted is the value of new capital issues on behalf of foreign
government and corporate borrowers.6 The figure shows that, as the yield on
domestic medium-grade bonds declined between 1923 and 1927 and that on foreign
bonds grew increasingly attractive, U.S. foreign lending increased. The fall
in U.S. foreign lending after 1927 coincides similarly with a fall in the
spread of foreign over domestic yields. Yet rates of return by themselves
account for little of the variation in the volume of foreign lending. The
role of other factors --specificallyrisk --isespecially evident before
1924, when many U.S. investors seem to have been unwilling to lend to
foreigners at any price. Foreign lending rises thereafter despite the absence
of any noticeable change in relative rates of return.7
The risks which deterred foreign lending in the early 1920s are most
evident in Central Europe. So long as the level of their reparations—11—
obligations remained uncertain, it was unclear whether the nations of this
region would have the resources needed to service additional debt. If they
had the resources, it was not evident that they would succeed in mobilizing
them. In Germany and many of the newly-created nations of Eastern Europe, the
stability of governments remained in doubt. The successor states of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire had no tax systems in place. Hyperinflation was
evidence of their failure to balance government budgets through conventional
means. In effect, the inability of these countries to borrow in the early
1920s reflected the operation of two factors also impeding borrowing in the
1980s: a large debt overhang in the form of existing obligations (which in the
1920s mainly took the form of war debts and reparations), plus questions about
ability of governments to mobilize export earnings in order to service
external debts.
Yet the perception that foreign lending was risky was not limited to
Central Europe. It applied also to countries with relatively small debts and
relatively stable governments. Compared to the levels achieved in the
second half of the 'twenties, lending to Latin America remained depressed. In
the immediate postwar years, foreign issues consisted primarily of
high-quality Canadian bonds and loans to the governments of Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland, nations that had remained neutral during the war and whose credit
was beyond reproach. Other countries obtained long-term loans from the U.S.
only under unusual circumstances and at exceptional cost: at 7.7 per cent,
yields to maturity on long term loans issued in 1920-21 were nearly 50 per
cent higher than yields on issues floated during the early war years and 15
per cent higher than they were to become in 1922_24.8—12—
Why did countries outside Central Europe find it so difficult to borrow
in the first half of the 1920s? The immediate postwar years were overshadowed
by the Bolshevik revolution. In many countries, labor movements and
affiliated political parties had gained new influence during hostilities, and
it was unclear how radical their programs might prove if and when they took
office. Governments deadlocked over the question of who should pay for the
war were left with no alternative but the inflation tax. The option of a
capital levy was seriously considered in every major European country, surely
discouraging investors, domestic and foreign alike, from holding claims on
governments.9 "Post-war Europe," in the words of Stoddard (1932, p.85),
"could hardly be rated as an 'A-i' investment opportunity."
But the dominant factor was surely the depressed level of world trade and
uncertain prospects for its recovery. Export volumes worldwide remained
depressed relative to 1913 levels, as many governments retained tariffs and
quantitative restrictions imposed during the war. Unless trade recovered, the
ability of countries to generate foreign exchange receipts and service
external debts would be permanently reduced. Contemporaries saw monetary
stabilization -—specificallya return to the gold standard -—asa necessary
condition for the restoration of domestic prosperity and the reduction of
restrictions needed for the recovery of trade. Only with the termination of
Central European hyperinflatioris, capped by Germany's stabilization in
1923-24, and the international movement back onto the gold standard did
investors conclude that trade ultimately would recover and did the capital
markets take heart.
The recovery of international trade hinged, -in the view of observers, on
the financial restoration of Central Europe, notably of Germany, the region's—13—
leading industrial and commercial power. Hence the 1923-24 League of Nations
Loans to Austria and Hungary and the 1924 Dawes Loan to Germany, by cementing
that restoration, had a catalytic impact on U.S. lending to the region.
(Details on the League Loans are provided in Table 4.) If a lesson for the
1980s is to be drawn from the initiation of this earlier debt cycle, it is
that when disruptions to trade and a debt overhang interrupt the flow of
lending, outside intervention by governments or international institutions may
serve to restart it.
Why were the League Loans successfully placed? First, they offered
exceptionally attractive returns. The 1923 League Loan to Austria bore a
yield to maturity of 7.8 per cent. The 1924 League Loan to Hungary offered a
yield to maturity of 8.6 per cent; on the day it was floated in London,
British Consols were yielding only half that amount.1° But while a risk
premium of 100 per cent eliminates much of the mystery, it does not provide
the entire answer. Insofar as risk increases with the premium charged, there
may be no interest rate at which the market takes up the loan. An important
part of the explanation must lie, therefore, in governmental supervision and
sponsorship. Before the loans received League of Nations support, governments
engaged in discussions with the Financial Committee of League, involving plans
to eliminate the fiscal deficit, to reform the central bank and to strictly
control future expenditures. In both the Austrian and Hungarian cases, the
League appointed a Commissioner-General resident in the country, who was
granted extraordinary access to government officials and vested with
responsibility for supervising the collection of loan service and verifying
the government's adherence to the protocols negotiated with the League.Table 4
League Loan Debtors and Creditors, 1923-28
Amount
Date Name (f millions)
1923Austrian Government Guaranteed Loan 33.6
1924State Loan of the Kingdom of Hungary 14.2
1924Greek Government 7 per cent Refugee Loan 12.2
1925Municipality of Danzig 7 per cent Mortgage Loan 1.5
1926Kingdom of Bulgaria 7 per cent Settlement Loan 3.4
1927Free City of Danzig 6 per cent (Tobacco Monopoly)
State Loan 1.9
1927Republic of Estonia 7 per cent (Banking and Currency
Reform) Loan 1.5
1928Greek Government 6 per cent Stabilization and RefugeeLoan 7.5
1928Kingdom of Bulgaria 7 per cent Stabilization Loan 5.4
Total 81.2

















Source: League Loans Committee, Third Annual Report, London, June 1935,
pp. 60 and 61.—14-
Thus, very extensive measures were taken not only to eliminate domestic
sources of fiscal imbalance but to establish an institutional means whereby
the borrowing country's progress might be monitored. It is no surprise that
potential investors viewed the League Loans differently from ordinary bond
issues. Moreover, in the case of the Austrian Loan, the sponsoring
governments effectively collateralized the loan by depositing bonds in its
amount in earmarked accounts. In the case of other League Loans, such as that
to Hungary, although no such collateral was provided, investors were left with
the impression that the sponsoring governments would take whatever steps
proved necessary to insure continued debt service.
Unlike Austria and Hungary, Germany's negotiation of a foreign loan did
not occur under League of Nations aegis. Due to its entanglement with the
reparations issue, it resulted instead from an American plan to assemble a
committee of business experts to deal with the external problem. The Dawes
Plan announced to the public in April 1924 included a loan in the amount of
800 million RM, half to be floated in the U.S., a quarter in Britain, and the
remainder in France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. As with
the League Loans, the market's response was overwhelming. The issue was
oversubscribed in Britain by a factor of 13, in New York by a factor of ten.
The enthusiasm with which American investors took up the Dawes Loan is
striking in the light of earlier skepticism about European floatations. Even
the bankers had greeted the plan with considerable skepticism. In part,
success resulted from propitious financial market conditions. The Federal
Reserve discount rate had been reduced in the spring of 1924 by an
exceptionally large amount, from 4i to 3 per cent, rendering foreign—15--
investments attractive for their return.11 The American tranche was sold to
the public at 92, to be redeemed at 105; together with a nominal interest rate
of 7 per cent, this meant that it yielded 7.6 per cent. In addition, the U.S.
government and New York banks had pressed for British and French involvement,
partly to create domestic interests in those countries that would oppose
giving priority to reparations over commercial liabilities. Involving foreign
investors increased U.S. confidence that Dawes Loan obligations would not be
subordinated to reparations. A final explanation for the success of the loan
lies in the aggressive publicity campaign launched in its support. Even
President Coolidge urged patriotic American investors to subscribe.
Once the pump was primed by these measures to buttress financial
stability in Europe and to ensure the restoration of international trade, it
continued to operate on its own. For many investors, foreign dollar bonds had
been until recently an unfamiliar instrument. But American investors grew
accustomed to holding bonds through the good offices of the U.S. Treasury,
which aggressively administered the Liberty Loan campaign during World War I.
Under the Liberty Loan Act of 1917, the Secretary of the Treasury was
authorized to purchase obligations of foreign governments at war with enemies
of the United States. U.S. purchases of foreign securities were financed by
selling the American public dollar—denominated securities -in matching amounts.
The rate of interest charged the European borrowers was simply the rate
required by American investors plus a small spread to cover costs. American
investors encouraged to subscribe by extensive publicity campaigns did so in
the amounts shown in Table 5. 'tMillions of individuals who had never clipped
a coupon or owned a share of stock, now became uinvestment_mindedhu for the
first time in their lives."12Table 5
Loans by the United States Government, Under the
Liberty Loan Act, 1917_22a
(millions of dollars, calendar years)
Borrower 1917 1918 1919 1920-22 Total
Belgium 75.4 141.6 121.7 8.5 347.2
Cuba -— 10.0 -— —2.3 7.7
Czechoslovakia -- 5.0 49.3 7.7 62.0
France 1,130.0 966.4 801.0 35.9 2,933.3
Great Britain 1,860.7 2,122.0 287.4 —133.6 4,136.5
Greece —- —- 5.0 10.0 15.0
Italy 400.0 776.0 444.9 27.1 1,648.0
Rumania -— —— 25.0 —1.8 23.2
Russia 187.7 —- -— —- 187.7
Serbia 3.0 7.8 16.0 -0.7 26.1
Total 3,656.8 4,028.8 1,750.3 —49.2 9,386.7
a. Compiled from data given in the Combined Annual Reports of the World War
Foreign Debt Commission, Fiscal Years 1922—26 (1927), pp. 2, 318-25, by Lewis
(1938). For 1919 the British figure and the total are both net, after
deductions have been made to take account of 7.6 million dollars repaid by
Great Britain during that year. The minus signs used in the 1920-22 column
indicate repayments in excess of cash advances.
Source: Lewis (1938), p. 362.—16—
American investors' appetite for foreign bonds having been awakened,
changes in the scope and structure of U.S. financial markets helped to satisfy
it. Sales of foreign dollar bonds were buoyed by the growth of the investing
public. In 1914, by one estimate, there were no more than 200,000 American
bond buyers in a market limited largely to Boston and its environs.13 But by
1922, when an income of $5,000 a year was required, according to reputable
investment bankers, to participate in the bond market, the annual incomes of
nearly 600,000 Americans exceeded this amount, and by 1929 there were more
than one million such individuals.'4
Both the wartime and postwar transformation of American commercial
banking and the growth of the investment trust reinforced these trends.
Before World War I, few national banks had engaged in the securities business.
Only in exceptional instances did they do more than provide their customers
information. But the banks became heavily involved in the wartime campaign to
distribute Liberty Bonds. Following the war's conclusion, they attempted to
retain as clients purchasers of Liberty Bonds by offering them foreign
obligations. Many investors who developed a newfound interest in the bond
market grew accustomed to buying and selling through the bond departments of
commercial banks, which expanded dramatically in consequence. Between 1922
and 1931, the number of national banks engaged in securities operations
through their bond departments increased from 62 to 123.
By establishing a security affiliate, banks could engage in the entire
range of bond—market activities without the restrictions of federal or state
banking laws. A security affiliate also permitted them to circumvent the
barriers to interstate branching. Between 1922 and 1931, the number of—17—
national bank security affiliates grew from 10 to 114. By 1919 National City
Bank's underwriting and brokerage affiliate, the City Company, had opened
branch offices in 51 cities, often on the ground floor to encourage walk-in
business. It publicized the attractions of a bond portfolio through
advertisements in popular magazines such as Harper's and Atlantic Monthly.
Banks and their affiliates took an active role not only in retailing but
in the origination of foreign bond issues. In the 1920s American banks for
the first time expanded overseas on a significant scale. Prior to the passage
of the Federal Reserve Act, national banks had been prohibited from branching
abroad. Although private banks and some state banks were permitted to do so,
as late as 1914 there existed only 26 foreign branches of American banks. The
Federal Reserve Act relaxed the constraint on foreign branching, however, and
World War I, by disrupting the ability of European banks to extend export
credits, provided the impetus for American banks to move overseas. Although
some retrenchment occurred in the years to follow, by 1920 the number of
foreign branches of U.S. banks had increased to 181. These branches provided
a steady stream of contacts between American bankers and potential foreign
borrowers. 15
The need for a diversified portfolio, impressed upon potential purchasers
by responsible salesmen, limited the involvement of the small investor.16
Increasingly, however, this constraint was relaxed by the growth of the
investment trust. A forerunner of the modern mutual fund, the investment
trust pooled the subscriptions of its clients, placed their management in the
hands of specialists, and issued long-term securities entitling holders to a
share of the organization's earnings. The modern investment trust originated-18-
largely in Britain, where it traditionally specialized in foreign bonds.'7
When the investment trust first appeared on a significant scale in the United
States after 1921, many of the new institutions followed British example by
investing heavily in foreign bonds.18
Thus, in the 1920s as in the 1970s, the surge in foreign lending was
greatly facilitated by financial innovation. The rapid development of
retailing and underwriting activities and the proliferation of investment
vehicles provided financial organizations both incentive and opportunity to
increase their participation in foreign bond markets. While the growth of the
investing public and the low yields on domestic bonds created an incipient
demand for foreign assets, competition among financial institutions provided
the supply. It has been asserted, following Hiram Johnson, head of the
Senate's 1931-32 Foreign Bond Investigation, that these institutions competed
excessively, pushing loans on inexperienced foreign governments and forcing
bonds on naive domestic investors.19 The banking community counters that
established firms with reputations to protect had no incentive to promote
questionable investments, since "such securities would damage the
underwriter's credibility with investors, making it more difficulty for the
underwriter to sell securities in the future."2° While this logic is
impeccable, it may apply imperfectly to the 1920s by virtue of the fact that
many institutional participants in international bond markets were recent
entrants with little if any reputation to protect. The model fits better in
Britain, where the underwriting of foreign securities was handled almost
exclusively by a small number of long-established firms which agreed to limit
the extent of competition, dividing the field "among themselves and-19-
develop[ing] more or less permanent financing arrangements with various
foreign issuers.!t21 In the U.S., a distinctive feature of the market
environment in the 1920s was the extent of entry. Mintz (1950) notes that the
loans issued by various groups of banking houses in the 1920s fared very
differently, with only 14 per cent of the (non-Canadian) loans issued by three
participants ultimately defaulting, but nearly 90 per cent of the loans issued
by six other banking houses falling into default. Although Mintz is careful
not to identify the banking houses, the timing of their loans suggests that
the first group was comprised of long-time participants and the second of
recent entrants. One might speculate that firms in the second group were
simply less well managed, but it is also likely that their managements were
more inclined toward risky issues since they had less reputation to lose in
the event of default. If, in the long run, track record in comparison with
incumbants will drive unsuccessful entrants out of the market, there is no
reason to suppose that these forces had much effect between 1921 and 1929.
Critics blamed loan pushing on lax regulation by public authorities.
Until 1933 many of the operations of securities affiliates remained
unregulated. The popular argument, especially after the Wall Street Crash and
the onset of default, was that the establishment of bank securities affiliates
brought into conflict the bank's obligation to provide prudent advice to its
depositor—investors and its desire to sell the security issues it originated.
Even if the affiliate did not unduly favor the securities of its customers,
with a bond distribution network in place the affiliates had an interest -in
promoting the sale of bonds even when the supply of high-quality issues
declined. This notion that the establishment of affiliates led the banks to-20--
encourage reckless investment in foreign bonds contributed to the passage in
1933 of the Glass-Steagall Act outlawing the securities affiliate.22
The U.S. State and Commerce Departments also can be criticized for
inadequately screening individual loans. Banks originating foreign loans were
asked only to consult the State Department prior to offering an issue to
American investors. The State Department then consulted with the Treasury and
Commerce Departments before announcing whether or not it had an objection.
While the program was voluntary, bankers hesitant to cooperate risked
incurring the wrath of the Administration and losing its assistance in the
event of default. Critics such as Senator Carter Glass of Virginia complained
that the program was at the same time insufficiently stringent to prevent
dubious foreign loans and insufficiently clear to prevent potential investors
from interpreting a statement of "no objection" as the government's seal of
approval 23
The government's activities involved both education and data gathering.
Commerce attempted to make clear to American investors that German bond issues
ranked after reparations in priority of repayment. It published summaries of
economic conditions in foreign countries. In addition, its agents furnished
information on particular enterprises and investment projects, which the
Commerce Department mailed to hundreds of American banks. These agents were
sometimes able in their official capacity to obtain financial information to
which the bankers did not have access. Flence many U.S. banks came to rely on
assessments by Commerce Department agents of potential foreign investment
projects as part of normal business practice.24
The principal instances in which the U.S. authorities made use of their
oversight of foreign lending were in connection with foreign governments owing—21—
war debts to the United States.25 A strict loan embargo was imposed against
the Soviet Union. Washington disapproved a prospective Rumanian loan in 1922
because of the absence of a war debt funding agreement. It disapproved of
refunding issues for France until that country negotiated a war debt
settlement. Naturally, this policy proved unpopular in Europe, the French
threatening for example to impose a tariff on U.S. automobiles, which led in
1928 to permission to float French industrial securities on the American
market.26 This was only a particular instance of a general phenomenon, that
"(i]n almost all cases where the Government entered an objection, it could be
gotten round or in time removed" (Feis, 1950, p.13).
Compared to their attitude toward other countries, U.S. authorities were
surprisingly lenient in their treatment of German loans. While Commerce
Department agents in Berlin continually reminded Washington of the magnitude
of the reparations burden and of the danger that Germany would be unable to
both pay reparations and service municipal and corporate loans, the position
of the U.S. authorities remained ambiguous. Commerce continued to supply the
leading investment houses with information on the finances of municipalities
and even the prospects for specific investment projects. While the warnings
of its agents were passed on to the U.S. investment banking community, few if
any German loan applications met with formal objection. Starting in 1925, the
Commerce and State Departments issued somewhat ambiguous warnings to the
bankers. The State Department alluded to the possibility of an embargo on
loans to German states and municipalities in instances where such loans might
hamper transfers under the Dawes Plan.27
"While the Department of State raises no objection to this
flotation. .itfeels that American bankers should know that the
amount of German loans has become so large, and the control of—22—
exchange on behalf of the Allies is such, as to raise a question as
to whether or not it may be very difficult for German borrowers to
make the necessary transfers.ht2b
Why was German borrowing treated so leniently? It is not that Commerce
Department officials failed to recognize the danger of default. As early as
1925 internal memoranda warned of an investment "debacle," and in 1928 the
problem had achieved such proportions that middle-ranking officials were
warned to distance themselves from German lending to protect the government in
the event of default.29 But the State Department overrode the hesitations of
Commerce out of a desire to maintain German stability as a bulwark against
Bolshevism. Moreover, Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury for much of
the 1920s, actively represented the bankers' desire that German lending be
left unfettered. And ultimately, U.S. officials believed deeply in the
laissez faire approach to foreign lending --thatthe market knew best.
3. Pricing Foreign Debt
"Why did these people lend money to Austria, or Japan, or Germany,
or Argentine, or Belgium? Here, statistics are of little value.
Men have not yet found a way of measuring the motives of other men."
Morrow (1927).
A standard criticism of the international capital market in the 1920s is
that it failed to discriminate adequately among borrowers. Precisely the same
criticism has been leveled at U.S. creditors in the 1970's; Guttentag and
Herring (1985) argue that rates charged sovereign borrowers on bank loans
could not have adequately incorporated the determinants of country-risk prem-ia
because they varied so little across loans. Edwards (1986) has attempted to
test this hypothesis formally for both bank loans and bonds, using regression—23—
to analyze the relationship between ex ante spreads and correlates of the
country risk premium such as debt, reserves, investment, the current account
and imports as shares of GNP, the ratio of debt service to exports, the rate
of economic growth, the real exchange rate, and characteristics of the
borrower and the loan. His results for the bond market were mixed: rates
charged borrowers were found to rise with the debt/GNP ratio, to fall with the
investment/GNP ratio, and to decline with the maturity of the loan. The first
two of these results are consistent with the notion that bondholders
distinguished among good and bad credit risks. The coefficients on the other
variables were uniformly insignificant, however, suggesting that investors
paid little attention to other plausible indicators of country risk when
pricing foreign bonds.
These results provide a benchmark for comparison with my analysis of the
bond market in the 1920s. To analyze the determinants of the ex ante rate of
return required by bondholders in the 1920s, I employ data on the yield to
maturity on issue for bonds floated in the United States between 1920 and
1929. These data, compiled by Lewis (1938), include all foreign securities
issued and taken in the United States, both securities publicly issued and
privately taken. They exclude portions of such issues sold on foreign markets
(so far as could be determined) and securities of American-controlled
enterprises (which are considered direct investment), thereby differing from
other sources of information on the subject such as the Department of
Commerce's lists of foreign loans. (Both public and private issues are
similarly included in modern studies such as Edwards's.) The par value
of loans and the yield to maturity are provided by year of issue, domicile of-24—
borrower, maturity (long-term loans versus short-term loans of five years or
less), and type of borrower (national and provincial, municipal or corporate).
For the 1920s the required information is provided for 383 categories of
bonds. These data were then linked to information on the characteristics of
the borrowing countries. It was not possible to obtain information on all of
the independent variables used in modern analyses, regrettably insofar as this
renders the results to follow imperfectly comparable. But just as estimates
of national income, investment and related variables for the 1920s are not
available to historians, such estimates were not available to bondholders and
hence were unlikely to be used in pricing foreign bonds. The
readily-available indicators of policy stance were foreign trade and public
finance statistics.3° I therefore use the trade and budget balances as
measures of domestic policy. Contemporaries argued that a balance-of-trade
surplus should have been related negatively to the required rate of return on
bonds, since the larger the surplus the greater the export receipts available
for debt service. Similarly, a government budget surplus should have been
negatively associated with the required rate, since any budget surplus could
be used to retire domestic debt and reduce the governmentts total debt
burden.31 Data on these variables were drawn from publications of the League
of Nations for 221 of Lewis's 383 observations.32 Trade and budget surpluses
are measured as shares of imports and government expenditures, respectively.
The dependent variable is the spread over domestic risk free rates,
defined as the foreign yield minus the yield on securities rated Baa by
Moody's (annual averages). The value of the loan is divided by the value of
exports to control for country size.33 Regression results are reported in—25—
Table 6. The omitted alternatives (1929, Venezuela and corporation) are
picked up by the constant term.34 The spread varies considerably, with a mean
of 0.46 and a standard deviation of 1.20. According to the regressions, that
on short-term loans averaged 73 basis points below that on long term loans.
Although this result contrasts with that obtained by Edwards for the 1970s,
who found the yield on short-term bonds to be higher than that on long-term
issues, it is consistent with the presumption that the yield curve should be
positively sloped. The negative coefficients on public loans (both sovereign
and municipal) indicates that the public demanded a smaller risk premium than
on corporate bonds. This contrasts with Edwards' (1986) finding for the 1970s
of no discernible difference.
The remaining variables are dummies for countries, trade and budget
balances, and dummies for years prior to 1929. The first can be interpreted
as proxies for national reputation, the second as proxies for current policy,
the third as components of the spread not attributable to other
characteristics of the loans. The coefficients on years indicate some
tendency for the spread to rise over the course of the 1920s, as if market
participants recognized the increasingly risky nature of foreign loans.
According to the country dummies, the best bond-market reputations were
enjoyed, not surprisingly, by Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway,
Sweden), members of the British Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, Ireland),
small Western European countries (Switzerland, the Netherlands), and small
Central American republics economically or politically dependent on the United
States (Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama).35 There were good
reasons to expect these countries to service their obligations promptly;Table 6
Bond Spreads: Pooled Data 1920-29



























































































































Number ofObservations 221 221
R2 .88 88
Notes: White—corrected t-statistics in parentheses. The omitted alternatives
are 1929, Venezuela and corporations.
Source: See text.—26—
bondholders' willingness to lend to them at favorable rates indicates some
significant ability to discriminate among potential borrowers. Conversely,
high rates were charged the new nations of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania), a country engaged in an
international dispute (Greece), and Latin American nations with a history of
debt service disruptions (Bolivia, Peru). Again, given the political and
economic situation in these countries and, in the case of Latin America, their
past record of servicing debt, bondholders' tendency to demand a risk premium
indicates some ability to discriminate among borrowers. At the same time, the
relatively small risk premia charged Germany, the leading borrower of American
funds, and a number of the larger South American republics raise questions
about whether bondholders discriminated adequately.
The coefficients on the trade and budget balances provide additional
information relevant to this question. While the coefficient on the trade
surplus is negative as anticipated, it differs insignificantly from zero.
Moreover, the coefficient on the budget surplus is positive, although
essentially zero. From this evidence, it does not appear that bondholders
attached much weight to readily—available indicators of the current
macroeconomic situation when determining the price at which to lend. It would
seem that reputation more than current economic developments influenced bond
market participants.
The remaining variable is loan size (scaled by exports). While its
coefficient is negative, it differs insignificantly from zero, as in Edwards's
sample of bonds issued in the 1970s. It seems curious that foreign borrowers
were not charged a premium when floating larger loans, since the larger the-27—
loan, the greater the cost to the issuing house if the entire amount was not
successfully placed and had to be absorbed by the sponsoring bankers, to be
resold later at a loss. One possibility is that the bankers' commission
rather than the price to the public responded to the size of the loan.
Typically, foreign floatations in the United States in the 1920s were
sponsored by a money center bank or issue house responsible for origination.
Often shares of the issue were then sold to a syndicate of underwriting banks
which shared responsibility for advertising, marketing and ultimately
absorbing any residual amount of the bond issue which the public proved
unwilling to purchase.36 Hence the bankers' commission represented
compensation for normal costs of marketing and advertising, compensation for
underwriting risk, and possibly economic profit due to the relatively small
number of issue houses active in the market.
Lewis (1938) provides information not only on the yield received by the
public (the variable utilized in the regression analysis reported above) but
also on that paid by the borrower; the difference measures the bankers'
commission. That commission averaged 30 basis points on foreign bonds issued
in the U.S. in the 1920s and could reach substantial levels; on Poland's 1925
national loan, for example, on which the price to the bankers was 86.3 and the
price to the public 95.5, the commission amounted to nearly a full percentage
point on a loan bearing a nominal interest rate of eight per cent.37
The determinants of the bankers' commission are analyzed in Table 7 using
the same variables utilized to analyze the return required by the public,
except that loan value is not entered as a ratio to exports. Comparing Tables
6 and 7 reveals that commissions moved very differently over time than ratesTable 7
Determinants of Bankers Commission: Pooled Data, 1920-29
(dependent variable is difference between








































































































































































































































Number ofObservations 221 221
R2 .58 .52
Notes: Ordinary least squares regressions with White-corrected t—statistics
in parentheses. The omitted alternatives are 1929, Venezuela and
corporations.
Source: See text.-28-
to the public. Commissions rose gradually from 1920 through 1925 and fell
back in 1926-27, before recovering in 1928—29. Mintz (ch. 4) notes that a
number of new banking houses entered the foreign lending business after 1924,
which should have driven the commission down. Similarly, a number of houses
withdrew from the market starting in 1928, permitting the commission to
recover.
The commission on short-term loans was 25 basis points lower than that on
long—term issues, presumably reflecting the smaller loss in the event that the
issuing house was forced to absorb any portion not taken up by the market.
This is consistent with Kuzcynski's (1932) findings based on a sample of
German bonds. Commissions on sovereign and municipal loans were slightly
lower than on otherwise comparable loans to corporations. There is a negative
association between the size of the loan and the bankers' commission,
indicating that economies of scale associated with marketing large loans may
have offset the extra risk to the issuing bankers.38 In any case, there is no
evidence in either Tables 6 or 7 that price was used to deter borrowers from
floating larger loans.
The coefficients on the trade and budget-balance variables have the same
signs as in the regressions explaining the spread, but in the commission
regressions the trade-balance variable is significantly less than zero at
standard confidence levels. There are at least three plausible
interpretations of this difference between Tables 6 and 7. My preferred
interpretation is that specialists had more knowledge of bond market risks,
recognized the danger that it might be difficult to market the loans of
countries running trade deficits, and demanded compensation. Another—29—
possibility is that the bankers were less able than bondholders to diversify
away the risks associated with a specific issue. Given the practice of
forming syndicates to underwrite loans it would appear that considerable
diversification was possible, however. Finally, it could be that simultaneity
tending to bias the trade-balance coefficient upward (since countries charged
low commissions could borrow more and hence were permitted to run large
deficits) is less of a problem in Table 7 than in Table 6 (where a more
important source of simultaneity would arise from the ability of countries
charged low interest rates to borrow more and hence to run deficits).
In sum, this analysis provides some evidence that lenders discriminated
among potential borrowers on the basis of reputation and political factors
conveying information about the probability of default, but little evidence
that they were responsive to current economic conditions in the indebted
countries. Did they discriminate adequately? One way to approach this
question is to compare ex ante and ex post returns. A simple model can be
used as the basis for this comparison. The expected rate of return on risky
loans 1r should exceed the risk free rate i by a risk premium:
(3) 1r =1f
+öa
where a is default risk so .50 is the premium on risky loans. Ex ante (of
default) the return on risky loans exceeds that required:
(4) 'ex ante =r
+130
wherelex ante is the ex ante rate of return. The ex post return 1ex post
differs from that required by investors by their expectational error .-30-
(5) j =i +c
ex post r
Substituting and solving for the ex ante return gives:
(6) 'ex ante =— Ô'f+(1+)iexpost
—(1+)e
If investors' expectat-lonal errors have mean zero, in a regression of ex ante
on ex post returns the constant term (-i) shouldbe negative and the
coefficient on 'ex should be not less than unity. Only -if investors
uniformly overestimate the return on foreign lending (c<O for all loans) can
the constant term be positive.
Using the ex ante and ex post rates of return calculated by Eichengreen
and Portes (1986) for a sample of 50 dollar bonds (national, provincial,
municipal and corporate) issued in the U.S. between 1924 and 1930, equation





with t-statistics in parentheses. The constant term is positive, indicating
plausibly that the extent and cost of default in the early 1930s were not
fully anticipated by investors (c significantly less than zero on average).
But this tells us little about market efficiency, since there is no reason to
suppose that an efficient market could have anticipated a single large
negative value of £onthe order of that which resulted from the macroeconomic
collapse of the 1930s. More tellingly, the coefficient ex post -is
significantly less than unity, which is inconsistent with the joint hypothesis
of rational expectations and market efficiency. What kind of systematic—31—
expectational errors does this imply? Instead of (6), posit investor errors
of the form:
(5') iexpost=ir+€_aa
which can be interpreted with a>Q as meaning that investors systematically
underestimate the cost of default on those bonds most at risk. Then it is
possible for the coefficient on 1ex
post
to be less than unity and, if a>ö,
for that coefficient to be negative as in (7).
Thus, these results suggest that investors incompletely incorporated
differential default risk into the spreads they demanded of foreign borrowers.
This is a bit surprising in light of the observed tendency (Table 6) of
bond-market participants to demand low risk premia of many borrowers which did
not default (Scandinavian and Western European nations, members of the British
Commonwealth, dependent Central American republics) and high risk premia many
borrowers which did default (Eastern European nations, other small Latin
American nations), since both tendencies should have given rise to a negative
correlation between ex ante and ex post returns. But despite demanding risk
premia in the appropriate instances, it nonetheless appears that they received
inadquate compensation. This is particularly evident in the comparison
between loans to Western European nations which performed well ex post and
loans to Germany which performed disastrously and between loans to Argentina
and Brazil.
If default risk was imperfectly perceived at time of issue, did
bondholders recognize and act upon it subsequently? If risk neutral investors
are faced with the choice between two assets, only one of which is subject to—32—
default risk, the return on the risk-free asset should be a weighted average
of the return on the other asset in instances in which default does and does
not take place, where the perceived probability of default is the weight.




where P is the probability of default, and and iarethe risky and risk—
free rates of return respectively. The expected capital loss aP (default
probability times per cent capital loss given default) can be derived from the
spread .39
(3) aP =[(irif)/(1+ir)]
Moody's Aaa bond rate and the yield to maturity on the sample of 50
dollar bonds, each at the end of the calendar year, are used as measures of
the riskless and risk-free rate. Several expected losses from the sample of
50 dollar bonds described above are depicted in Figures 2-7. Figures 2 and 3
for Colombia and Brazil show that through 1929 the market's expectation of
capital loss was low (4 per cent or less). Thereafter, the expected loss due
to default began to rise. Since the first defaults occurred in 1931, while
the spreads on Colombian and Brazilian bonds rose in 1930, there is some
indication that the danger of default was anticipated by market participants.
Was this a perceived increase in the probability of default by those countries
which ultimately suspended debt service, or did market participants revise
their expectations for all Latin American bonds? Figure 4 suggests thep 
193j 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































latter, although the timing and rate of growth of the expected loss differed
across issues. Argentine central and provincial government debt fell to
discounts even in instances where no default ultimately occurred. The
expected capital loss on the 1925 Argentine loan had risen by 1932 to the
levels achieved by Brazilian and Colombian bonds -in 1931. But Argentina's
expected loss rises later and declines once it is clear that the national
government intends to maintain service on the debt. The 1927 Province of
Tucuman issue behaves very differently: the expected loss begins to rise as
early as 1930 and reaches high levels in 1932-33 as default takes place on
other state and municipal Argentine loans. Once it becomes clear that debt
service will be maintained, spreads return to their initial levels.
Figures 5 through 7 provide information on the pricing of European bonds.
They suggest that the externalities associated with the initial Latin American
defaults were limited largely to Latin America; significant discounts on the
German, Austrian and Hungarian bonds depicted in Figures 5-6 do not appear
until 1932, despite the spread of Latin American defaults from early 1931. It
is remarkable that more serious doubts about Central European bonds did not
materialize as early as 1930, when the Young Plan rescheduling of reparations
was needed to prevent Germany from falling into arrears. Even at this late
date National City Company was still suggesting that It is reasonable to
believe that the new loan.. .marks the beginning of a widening demand for
German bonds, both in this country and abroad. And the present, therefore,
would seem to be an opportune time for their purchase."4°
Figure 7 depicts the behavior of spreads on three Scandinavian loans
serviced promptly throughout. Before 1932, spreads on these loans remain—34—
exceptionally low. They then rise in 1932 as default spreads to Eastern
Europe, although to nowhere near the levels of the German, Austrian and
Hungarian bonds in Figures 5-6. As in Latin America, there is evidence that
the German, Austrian and Hungarian defaults had contagion effects on the
perceived credit-worthiness of other European borrowers.
Does this evidence suggest that default carried negative externalities by
creating doubt about the credit-worthiness of even those nations which
continuously maintained service on their obligations? In the 1930s, it
appears that such externalities existed but were confined mainly to other
countries in the same region. The first Latin American defaults did not have
a discernible impact on the bonds of countries in other parts of the world.
But when these effects occurred, they were persistent; it took four years, for
example, for the initial impact on Argentine credit-worthiness to dissipate.
4. Default and Market Access
"The great depression that began in 1929 brought our first great
venture in foreign lending to a sick end. There had been a thrill
about this swift financial ascension over the oceans. It was gone,
and seemingly for all time.. .A general sigh of resolve was to be
heard over the United States: never again should we lend or invest
our money in foreign lands."
Feis (1950, p.1)
The debt defaults of the 1930s were sobering for American investors. The
performance of U.S. portfolio investments abroad, notably debts of foreign
governments, was particularly disheartening. Approximately two thirds of
foreign securities held by American investors fell into default over the
course of the Depression decade. Contemporaries believed that the experience
of the 'thirties had a lingering impact on the attitudes of investors. The—35—
United Nations explained the postwar decline in private loans to governments
on the basis of "losses resulting from default and only partly mitigated by
subsequent agreements with the borrowers that bondholders have accepted in
order to avoid more severe loss.. "41 When transmitting to the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations in 1949 a study by the National
Association of Manufacturers of the potential for U.S. capital exports
following the conclusion of the Marshall Plan, Curtis E. Calder, Chairman of
the Association's International Relations Committee, expressed this view as
follows:
-
"Wefeel further that the relative undesirability of
inter-governmental loans has been impressed equally upon grantors
and recipients. After the experience of the 'thirties and the
serious balance of payment difficulties now plaguing most of the
world, the superiority of equity over loan financing has, we
believe, a universal appeal.. .We strongly recommend that no
reliance be placed upon inter-governmental loans outside of the
category of those qualifying within the limits of the funds of
Export-Import Bank and the Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. "42
Despite a proliferation of similar statements, it is not obvious that the
experience of the 'thirties influenced investors' actions as well as their
statements, particularly since a variety of other postwar disruptions might
conceivably have exercised an even more powerful influence over the volume and
pattern of foreign lending. Moreover, any new hesitancy to extend loans to
foreign governments did not have a sufficient half life to prevent the
astounding growth of sovereign debt in the 1970s. Still, it seems plausible
that repercussions of the debt defaults of the 1930s were felt by the capital
markets in the 1940s and 1950s. One approach to this issue is to compare U.S.
foreign lending in the ten years immediately succeeding World Wars I and II.-36-
Clearly, the second half of the 1940s and first half of the 1950s comprise a
very special period in the history of the world economy, following as they do
on the heels of a global conflagration. Since the years 1919-28 comprise an
equally special period for many of the same reasons, they provide an
especially useful basis for comparison. Admittedly, a study of the ten years
immediately following World War II is not a complete analysis of the legacy --
ifany --ofinterwar debt defaults. But if no legacy of default can be
discerned in the immediate postwar decade when interwar experience was so
immediate and the parallels were so extensive, it seems unlikely that such
evidence could be found for subsequent years.
In comparing U.S. foreign lending in the decades immediately following
the two world wars, it is useful to distinguish three questions. First, was
total U.S. foreign lending depressed in the wake of the debt defaults of the
1930s? Second, was the relative importance of direct and portfolio investment
altered by the lingering effects of interwar defaults? Third, compared to
countries which continuously serviced their debts, did countries which had
defaulted find it more difficult to borrow abroad?
Table 8 summarizes the volume and composition of U.S. foreign lending in
the two postwar decades. Lending from 1946 through 1955 is expressed -in
1919—28 average prices. A first fact evident from Table 8 is that US.
capital exports actually were larger in the second postwar decade (more than
three times as large at current prices, more than twice as large at constant
prices). However, the difference is due almost entirely to unilateral
transfers by government, notably the Marshall Plan.(The amount and direction
of Marshall Plan aid are summarized in Table 9.) Net of official transfers,Table 8
U.S. Foreign Lending in the Two Postwar Decades, 1919-28 and 1946-55
(in millions of current dollars for 1919-28
and in 1919—28 average prices for 1946—55)
Decade
1919192019211922192319241925192619271928Average
Public, long & short term2328 175-30 -31 —91 -28 -27—30-46—49 217
Private
Direct, long term 94 154 111 153148 182268 351351558 237
Other, long term 75400 477669235 703 603470 636 752 502
Short term na na na na 82 109 46 36349 231 142
Unilateral transfers
Private 832634450314 328339 373361355 346 433




Public, long & short term27053079690 462 106 96 265139-59 197 682
Private
Direct, long term 206 546486 468424 311 537469425523 444
Other, long term —114 36 47 57338268 135-118204 153 107
Short term 278 137 78—133102 63 59—107 404 121 97
Unilateral transfers
Private 603 497 470377310258 279 321 321 290 368
Government 2015141625803620243019041315126211311299 1871
Notes: na denotes not available. Decade average short term capital flow for the 'twenties is
for the years 1923-28 only.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1976), pp. 198-201, 866-67.-37—
U.S. foreign lending at constant prices remains almost exactly unchanged
between the two postwar decades. At the most aggregated level, then, there is
little evidence that the debt defaults of the 1930s had a damping effect on
the volume of U.S. lending.
Only at the aggregate level, however, is there little change. Putting
aside unilateral transfers, there is a reversal in the relative importance of
lending by government and by the private sector, the public sector accounting
for just 20 per cent after World War I but for fully 51 per cent after World
War II. The real value of private lending at constant prices (long- and
short-term combined) fell by nearly one third between the post-World—War-I and
post-World—War—Il decades. Within private lending, there are equally far
reaching changes in composition. While the share of short-term capital in
U.S. private lending remains more or less unchanged, the relative importance
of direct and portfolio investment is reversed. Where portfolio investment
was more than double direct investment in the decade following World War I, it
was less than a quarter of direct investment in the decade following World War
II. Although there are other reasons why reliance on direct investment might
have increased after World War II --suchas the standard presumption that
direct investment is relatively advantageous for firms engaged in the
manufacture of goods produced with firm-specific technical knowledge, a type
of production which tended to grow more important in international
transactions as the century progressed --itseems implausible that these
slowly-evolving factors rather than the repercussions of default were mainly
responsible for the very dramatic rise in direct investment after 1945. Due
to both the fall in the real value of private lending and the declining share-38-
of portfolio investment, the real value of the latter fell most dramatically
between decades, by more than 80 per cent. Overall, there was a dramatic
decline in the willingness of Americans to accumulate portfolio investments
abroad, precisely what one would expect had purchasers been deterred by
defaults on foreign bonds.
While the U.S. was far and away the leading capital exporter of the
post—World-War-Il period, she had not been so dominant after World War I. In
the period 1924—27, when U.S. capital exports fluctuated in the range of
$1.2—$1.6 billion per annum, total capital exports of the industrial countries
reached $2 billion annually and more.43 It is noteworthy, therefore, that
private capital exports of other industrial countries fell even more
dramatically between the two postwar decades than did the capital exports of
the United States. New issues for overseas account floated in London in the
period 1947-52 amounted to £45 million per annum, less than 50 per cent of the
current—price value of the period 1920—25. Meanwhile, British investors
steadily repatriated their foreign funds between 1946 and 1951. The nominal
value of the overseas investments of U.K. residents in the form of securities
quoted on the London Stock Exchange declined by £432 million.44 The outflow of
private capital from France over the period 1946-52 is estimated to have
approached a total of $1 billion; in contrast, in the period 1920—26 the total
outflow (excluding gold) had been more than $33 billion.45
Consistent country data on the extent of foreign borrowing after World
War II are notoriously difficult to obtain. Fortunately, courtesy of
Avramovic's (1958) massive study, reasonably consistent data on stocks of debt
at three points in time are available for 36 countries. As summarized inTable 9
European Recovery Program Direct and Conditional Aid,








Country Total Total DirectAgreement1 Union Credits
Total 10,260 9,1287,537 1,355 236 1,132
Austria 492 492 488 5 -- --
Belgium—Luxembourg 537 484 8 447 29 52
British Commonwealth:
United Kingdom 2,675 2,3291,799 380 150 346
Denmark 231 200 191 9 -- 31
France 2,060 1,8691,807 61 -— 191
Germany 1,174 1,172 953 219 2
Greece 387 386 386 -- 1
Iceland 17 13 10 4 3
Ireland 139 11 11 —- 128
Italy 1,034 959 873 86 74
Netherlands—Indonesia 893 743 711 32 151
Netherlands 809 659 628 30 151
Indonesia 84 84 83 1 --
Norway 199 164 153 11 -— 25
Portugal 33 8 (*) 8 -— 35
Sweden 103 82 (*) 77 s 20
Trieste 30 30 30 —— -— —-
Turkey 89 17 (*) 17 —- 71
International Organi-
zation: European
Payments Union 51 51 -— 51
Unclassified areas 116 116 116 --
*Lessthan $500,000.
1.Includes $3,500,000 extended by Iceland to Germany and $3,081,000 extended
by Italy to Trieste outside of the intra-European payments plan.
Source: US. Department of Commerce (1952), p. 60.—39-
Table 9, these include disbursed and undisbursed long-term debt owned or
guaranteed by public bodies in debtor countries (central and local
governments, public agencies and state-owned enterprises) and exclude grants
in aid (notably Marshall Plan aid), loans repayable in local currency, loans
with a maturity of less than 12 months, and drawings on the IMF. Debt is
valued as on the books of the borrowing countries.
In the raw data, no relationship between default in the 1930s and
borrowing after 1945 is apparent. But reputational effects are only a subset
of the factors affecting a government's willingness and ability to borrow
abroad. The United Nations, when discussing external borrowing in this
period, cited country size and the relative importance of imports in domestic
consumption as factors positively associated with borrowing.46 Standard
borrowing models suggest in addition that countries whose exports are most
variable will have the greatest tendency to borrow abroad in order to smooth
fluctuations in export receipts and domestic purchasing power.47 My analysis
of the role of these factors and of past debt-servicing records in the extent
of borrowing in the post-World-War II decade builds on the data in Table 10.
Additional information on external debt was obtained from United Nations
(1948) and the annual reports of the Council of Foreign Bondholders and
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, permitting Argentina, Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Venezuela, Egypt, Germany and Sweden to be added to the sample.
Information on imports, exports and GNP was obtained from International
Monetary Fund (1978), supplemented as necessary by United Nations (1958) and
Wilkie (1974). These were used to calculate measures of openness (the
import/GNP ratio in 1955) and export variability (the variance of exports overTable 10
External Public Debt Outstanding, 1945—1955
(December 31 of each year in thousands of US $equivalent)
Percentage
1945 1950 1955 1945—1955
Increase
1950—1955
Grand Total 7,732,24016,122,63518,329,325 137.1 13.7
Europe 3,594,80912,225,24811,726,205 226.2 —4.1
Austria 60,562 72,635 259,1462 327.9 256.8
Belgium 181,047 375,370 446,376 146.6 18.9
Denmark 272,135 389,493 251,984 -7.4 —35.3
Finland 147,998 326,742 292,177 97.4 —10.6
France 1,267,182 2,906,297 2,631,671 107.7 —9.4
Iceland 1,216 8,633 16,965 1,295.1 96.5
Italy 126,116 550,268 681,450 440.3 23.8
Luxemburg 5,310 19,502 17,342 226.6 —11.1
Netherlands 194,612 939,625 531,607 173.2 -43.4
Norway 222,456 286,523 347,476 56.2 21.3
United Kingdom1,116,175 6,061,234 5,920,196 430.4 —2.3
Yugoslavia n.a. 288,9261 329,815 na. 14.2
Africa 296,052 438,548 1,093,903 269.5 149.4
Belgian Congo 79,206 107,719 316,564 299.7 193.9
Ethiopia 2,786 12,000 32,583 1,069.5 171.5
Federation of
Rhodesia 69,157 169,806 368,410 432.7 117.0
Union of South




International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic Staff,
Statistics Division; reproduced from Avramovic (1955), p. 163.
Percentage
1945 1950 1955 1945—1955
Increase
1950—1955
Australia 1,760,514 1,288,118 1,400,0842 —20.5 8.7
Asia 495,764 429,461 1,426,125 187.7 232.1
Ceylon 37,918 26,345 59,470 56.8 125.7
India 47,467 58,998 486,378 924.7 724.4
Japan 402,945 309,121 627,855 55.8 103.1
Pakistan —— —— 181,785 -- --
Thailand 7,434 34,997 70,637 850.2 101.8
Latin America 1,585,102 1,741,260 2,683,008 69.3 54.1
Brazil 432,699 409,389 1,046,414 141.8 155.6
Chile 425,892 355,346 313,543 —26.4 —11.8
Colombia 171,447 157,545 281,079 63.9 78.4
Ecuador 24,222 31,944 59,254 144.6 85.5
El Salvador 13,383 22,367 28,263 111.2 26.4
Guatemala 878 378 21,172 2,311.4 5,501.1
Haiti 15,155 8,296 42,225 178.6 409.0
Honduras 5,430 1,260 4,200 -22.7 233.3
Mexico 200,577 509,099 478,944 138.8 —5.9
Nicaragua 5,776 4,640 22,730 293.5 389.9
Panama 15,641 13,000 20,463 30.8 57.4
Paraguay 15,781 15,287 17,974 13.9 17.6
Peru 104,842 107,176 215,366 105.4 100.9





the three years 1953-55). Finally, as a measure of the extent of interwar
default, the percentage of dollar and sterling external governmental debt (all
levels of government plus government—guaranteed loans to enterprise) in
default as to interest and/or sinking fund at the end of 1935 was calculated
from the reports of the two bondholders' committees. 1935 is chosen as the
year in which to measure interwar default since almost all of these defaults
occurred between 1931 and 1934.48 Admittedly, the share of debt in default is a
crude measure of reputation; it might be desirable in future work to include
the share of contracted debt service payments actually made, as Jorgensen
(1987) or Lindert and Morton (1987), or a measure of the outcome of
debtor-creditor negotiations, such as the Foreign Bondholders Protective
Committee's endorsement.
The absence of information on one or more of the independent variables
forced a number of countries to be dropped, leaving 32, of which 18 are Latin
American.49 Two types of regressions were run on this cross section. Those in
Table 11 analyze the determinants of net foreign borrowing by public
authorities ——thechange in the external debt between 1945 and 1955. Those
in Table 12 follow other recent studies of sovereign debt by taking as the
dependent variable not the net flow of resources over the decade but the
terminal stock —-thevalue of the external debt -in 1955. An advantage of the
stock formulation is that elasticities can be estimated directly by defining
the 1955 debt stock in log form (which is not possible for the flow of
borrowing since that variable can be negative).
Consider first the value of borrowing. The first equation in Table 11,
in which borrowing is regressed on only a constant term and the share of debtTable 11
Determinants of Foreign Borrowing, 1945—55
(dependent variable is in millions of U.S. dollars)
(1) (2) (3)
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Share of Debt -171.39











in default in 1935, suggests at best a weak negative relationship between
interwar default and external borrowing in the first post-World—War-Il decade.
The point estimate can be read to suggest that countries which defaulted
(share in default =1)borrowed $171.4 million less than countries that
serviced their entire debt (share in default =0).Since the mean of the
dependent variable is $334 million, this point estimate is substantial.
However, the next two equations indicate that this apparent difference among
countries is due entirely to other respects in which defaulting and
nondefaulting countries differed. Larger, more open countries borrowed more,
while countries more heavily indebted at the beginning of the postwar decade
borrowed less. These results are consistent with the observations of United
Nations (1965) and the predictions of optimal foreign borrowing models. The
only hypothesis not verified is the posited association between export
variability and the volume of borrowing, which is nonexistent in this period.
This variable is dropped, therefore, from the third equation. But the most
striking finding is that inclusion of these additional determinants of
borrowing reverses the association between interwar default and postwar
borrowing, yielding a positive correlation between default and subsequent
borrowing that is statistically significant at standard confidence levels.
There is no evidence that countries which defaulted in the interwar period
found it more difficult to borrow in the immediate post-World-War-Il years.
An obvious suspicion is that the inclusion of 1945 debt is mainly
responsible for reversing the coefficient on interwar default. Default in the
1930s, the argument would run, permitted countries to buy back their external
liabilities at deep discounts and, by reducing their debt burdens, facilitated-42-
subsequent borrowing. This does not seem to have been the case, however,
since dropping 1945 debt alters neither the sign nor the significance of the
coefficient on 1935 default.
The results in Table 12, concerned with variations in the terminal debt
stock, are consistent with those just discussed. Again, the value of the
external debt in 1955 is positively related to GNP and openness,
insignificantly related to export variability, and related to the 1945 debt
stock with an elasticity of less than unity (suggesting that countries heavily
indebted at the start of the period borrowed less over the interim). Most
importantly, interwar default is either positively associated or unrelated to
postwar indebtedness. Again, there is no evidence that countries which
defaulted in the 1930s found it more difficult to borrow in the 1940s and
1950s.
While the Abramovic data have the virtue of consistency, they have the
problem of combining all types of external debt accumulated by governments,
whether extended by international agencies, creditor country governments or
private investors. There is no reason to expect public lenders, in particular
the U.S. government at the beginning of the Cold War, to have responded to
market incentives and reputational factors in the same manner as private
investors. It would be desirable to analyze private portfolio lending (to
both the public and private sectors) separately from lending by public agencies
before concluding that no trace of interwar defaults can be discerned in the
geographical distribution of postwar lending. Unfortunately, post-WWII
balance—of—payments records of bond floatations and repurchases and of loans
from private foreign banks are of dubious quality. Typically, these areTable 12
Determinants of the Stock of Debt, 1955



























































Number of Observations 32 32 32 32
R2 0.74 0.88 0.74 0.88
F 15.16 37.39 19.29 47.67
Notes: b-statistics in parentheses.
Source: See text.-43-
derived as a residual from the balance-of-payments accounts by deducting from
total long-term capital inflows the sum of loans granted by international
agencies and foreign governments. Total long-term capital flows for this
period are themselves exceptionally difficult to measure accurately because of
the extent of security repurchases; while relatively good records are
available of new floatations and bank loans, little reliable information is
published on transactions in outstanding public or private securities held by
foreigners.
Nonwithstanding these difficulties, the United Nations (1965) has
published estimates of private portfolio lending to the Latin American
countries over the first postwar decade. These figures are shown in Table 13.
Table 14 combines them with the GNP, trade and default indicators described
above to analyze the association of interwar default with postwar portfolio
capital inflows for the 18 Latin American countries included in the preceding
analysis of the Abramovic data. The bivariate relationship between postwar
portfolio borrowing and interwar default, shown in the first column, is
positive but statistically insignificant. Once other correlates of the demand
for debt are added to the equation, the coefficient on interwar debt turns
negative, as the reputational hypothesis would predict, although the point
estimate of the coefficient remains smaller than its standard error. While
the sign of the coefficient on interwar default is somewhat sensitive to the
combination of other variables included in the equation (only when both GNP
and the curiously signed measure of export variability are included is the
coefficient on interwar default consistently negative), its low level of
significance is not. Once again, it is impossible to reject the nullTable 13
Private Portfolio Capital Inflows
to Latin American Countries, 1946-55
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Country 1946—50 1951—55
Argentina 22.5




Costa Rica -0.4 6.7
Cuba 38.3
Dominican Republic -3.0 1.1
Ecuador 3.6











Source: United Nations (1965), Annex Table D.Table 14
Determinants of Private Portfolio Capital
Inflow to Latin American Countries, 1946—55




Share of Debt 17.75 -14.31 -17.63



















Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: See text.—44-
hypothesis that variations across countries in the severity of interwar
default had essentially no impact on the relative ease with which countries
secured private portfolio capital inflows during the postwar years.
The two central findings of this section —-amuch reduced volume of
private portfolio lending and no greater difficulty of borrowing for countries
that had defaulted previously -—arenot difficult to reconcile with one
another. Recall the evidence from the previous section on the impact of one
country's default on the market's expectation of capital losses on neighboring
countries' bonds. That evidence suggests that some effects of interwar
defaults were external to the initiating country, a conclusion consistent with
the evidence from this section suggesting that the main legacy of interwar
debt defaults was to depress the volume of private portfolio lending generally,
not to divert it to faithful servicers from countries which lapsed into
default.
5.Conclusion
What picture of the capital market emerges from this study of the United
States' first 35 years as a creditor nation? It is patently impossible to
characterize the market as either perfectly rational or wholly irrational.
Advocates of a return to the bond market as a panacea for recent difficulties
with sovereign lending should take note of these conclusions. While switching
back from bank loans to the bond market may divert some of the risk shouldered
by creditor-country banking systems, bond market participants have shown no
greater facility than bank loan officers historically in distinguishing good
credit risks from bad. Nor were bond markets any more successful in smoothing
the flow of capital to developing-country debtors.—45—
What picture of the legacy of default for the subsequent behavior of the
markets emerges from this study of the last complete debt cycle? Recent
theoretical studies of sovereign lending in the presence of potential default
have posited the existence of a default penalty ,usuallyinterpreted as the
costs of inferior access to international capital markets in the wake of
default. The finding that, compared to countries which maintained debt
service throughout, countries which lapsed into default in the 1930s were no
less able to borrow in the 1940s and 1950s is difficult to reconcile with this
simple view. If there were costs of default, they did not take the form of
differential credit-market access in the first postwar decade. But this does
not imply that default was costless. Evidence from bond prices in the 1930s
and from the volume and composition of lending in the 1940s-1950s suggests
that at least some of the costs of default spilled over among debtor
countries. These costs took the form of reduced access to private portfolio
capital flows for defaulting and nondefaulting countries alike.
To say that default had costs is not to say that it was necessarily
welfare reducing. It may also have had benefits in the form of the spur to
growth and adjustment provided by a lightened debt burden. Comparisons of
economic growth and structural change in defaulting and nondefaulting
countries will be needed before welfare conclusions can be drawn. But the
fact that a substantial share of the costs were external to the individual
country indicates that there may be gains to debtors from coordinating their
decisions, whether or not that decision is to maintain service on their
external debts.-46-
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